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In recent years, research has demonstrated that crime victimization serves as a 
catalyst to political engagement. However, much of this work has not addressed 
two key issues: 1) the true causality of this relationship, and 2) how victims’ 
identities and personal experiences might influence this relationship. This pa-
per tackles these issues by testing the effect of victimization on non-electoral 
engagement using the Two-City, Six-Wave panel survey administered in Brazil 
between 2002 and 2006. It finds that the causal relationship between victimi-
zation and engagement only exists for participation in political party meetings. 
Furthermore, when exploring the role of individual identity and community 
context, only men, those who live in safe neighborhoods, and White Brazilians 
experience an increase in their engagement. Meanwhile, women, those in unsafe 
neighborhoods, and Afro-Brazilians do not experience such an increase. Those 
who have not experienced discrimination also increase their participation, while 
those who have experienced discrimination do not.
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Resumen
En los últimos años, las investigaciones han demostrado que la victimización por 
la delincuencia sirve de catalizador para el involucramiento político. Sin embar-
go, gran parte de estos trabajos no han abordado dos cuestiones importantes: 
1) la verdadera causalidad de esta relación, y 2) cómo las identidades y expe-
riencias personales de las víctimas pueden influir en esta relación. Este trabajo 
aborda estas cuestiones poniendo a prueba el efecto de la victimización en el 
involucramiento no electoral utilizando la encuesta de panel de Dos Ciudades, 
Seis Ondas en Brasil entre 2002 y 2006. Se encuentra que la relación causal 
entre la victimización y el involucramiento sólo existe para la participación en 
las reuniones de los partidos políticos. Además, cuando se explora el papel de la 
identidad individual y el contexto comunitario, sólo los hombres, los que viven 
en barrios seguros y los brasileños blancos experimentan un aumento de su in-
volucramiento. En cambio, las mujeres, los que viven en barrios inseguros y los 
afrobrasileños no experimentan dicho aumento. Los que no han sufrido discri-
minación también aumentan su participación, mientras que los que han sufrido 
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Nos últimos anos, pesquisas demonstraram que a vitimização do crime serve 
como um catalisador para o engajamento político. No entanto, grande parte des-
te trabalho não tratou de duas questões importantes: 1) a verdadeira causalida-
de desta relação, e 2) como as identidades das vítimas e as experiências pessoais 
podem influenciar esta relação. Este trabalho aborda estas questões testando o 
efeito da vitimização no engajamento não-eleitoral usando a pesquisa do painel 
Duas Cidades, Seis Ondas administrada no Brasil entre 2002 e 2006. Ele conclui 
que a relação causal entre vitimização e engajamento só existe para participação 
em reuniões de partidos políticos. Além disso, ao explorar o papel da identidade 
individual e do contexto comunitário, apenas os homens, aqueles que vivem em 
bairros seguros e os brancos-brasileiros experimentam um aumento em seu en-
gajamento. Enquanto isso, as mulheres, aqueles que vivem em bairros inseguros 
e os afro-brasileiros não experimentam tal aumento. Aqueles que não sofreram 
discriminação também aumentam sua participação, enquanto aqueles que so-
freram discriminação não o fazem.
INTRODUCTION
It is well understood that Latin America is home to some of the world’s most 
violence-stricken nations. Countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, Brazil, Colom-
bia, and Mexico have some of the highest rates of intentional homicides, ranging 
between 25 to 62 per 100,000 people. Meanwhile, the global average is only 6.1 
per 100,000 (Data UNODC, 2017). In addition to homicide, the prevalence of oth-
er types of violent crime mean that Latin America is home to thousands of crime 
survivors. Although our understanding of the quantity of such individuals is flawed, 
with underreporting for violent crimes sometimes reaching up to 90 % (Laterzo, 
2020), we know such victims represent a large portion of society.
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Not only do crime victims represent a significant proportion of both the popu-
lation and the electorate, but violence also has meaningful political consequences. 
These include, but are not limited to, effects on democratic values, political partici-
pation and engagement, and voting behavior (Ley, 2013). One of such areas that 
remains under-explored is that of political participation and engagement, such as 
participation in protests, engagement in political conversations, and voting. For the 
purposes of this paper, I will refer to various non-electoral forms of political partici-
pation and engagement as simply “political engagement”1. Many argue that there 
is a direct causal relationship between victimization and these practices. These 
literatures are typically divided among those that explore the effect of victimiza-
tion on non-electoral (Bateson, 2012; Brooks, 2014) and electoral (Ley, 2017; Ley, 
2018; Trelles & Carreras, 2012) forms of engagement. Some explore both forms 
(Blattman, 2009). In both camps, there is disagreement about whether or not vic-
timization and violence lead to increased, or decreased, engagement.
In this article, I argue that we can see two main gaps in prior research assessing 
the role victimization plays in altering political engagement patterns. First, there is 
a methodological issue. Previous studies often utilize single-year cross-sectional 
data to suggest a relationship between victimization and engagement. Unfortu-
nately, such an approach is misleading, as without temporal variation and track-
ing of the same individuals, it is difficult to assert a true, individual-level causal 
relationship. Only certain authors, such as Oosterhoff, Kaplow, Layne & Pynoos 
(2018), have been able to actually trace individual level data to isolate the effects 
of victimization on engagement2. Thus, there is limited evidence of the causal na-
ture of this relationship. Therefore, it is quite possible that the relationship be-
tween victimization and engagement is simply associational.
Second, the disagreement in the literature could be due to the fact that that 
the effect of victimization and violence on political engagement is dependent on 
one’s community context and social identity. The literature often assesses socie-
ties as relatively uniform in citizen exposure to violence and victimization. Or, au-
thors have treated countries with higher or lower levels of violence as relatively 
1. As will be discussed, scholars who examine these various types of political engagement use a va-
riety of terms to describe them. For example, Bateson (2012) classifies reported attendance at com-
munity meetings, political meetings, and town meetings; level of interest in politics; and attempts to 
convince others of political views all as forms of “participation” while Hadzic, et al. (2020), Hadzic & 
Tavits (2019), and others use the term “engagement” to refer to concepts such as the intention to vote 
and one’s interest in politics. Furthermore, there is significant debate as to what exactly comprises the 
realm of political “participation,” for example see (Van Deth, 2014). For this reason, I choose to utilize 
the more encompassing term of “political engagement” to refer to a variety of possible means of engag-
ing in politics, across the spectra of formality and conventionality.
2. In addition, Blattman (2009) does, notably, substantiate his findings with qualitative interviews, 
giving more legitimacy to his causal claims.
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comparable. However, this is not the case. Rather, individuals and communities 
that have higher rates of victimization are unique in their engagement patterns, 
and should be researched as such. For example, Ley (2018) demonstrates that in 
particularly insecure areas, the criminal context of a community can “transcend” 
one’s personal victimization experience. Furthermore, there is substantial evi-
dence of individual-level variation in engagement patterns based on one’s identity 
and experience – such as one’s gender, ethnicity, or experience with discrimination 
(Desposato & Norrander, 2009; Oskooii, 2016; Hadzic & Tavits 2019). Previous 
literature has done little to explore the intersection of identity and victimization, 
and how such intersections may influence engagement patterns.
I thus argue there are two main gaps in the literature that research should fur-
ther explore: the causal link between victimization and political engagement, and 
the effects of context, identity, and individual experience on this relationship. This 
paper seeks to fill these gaps by first testing the relationship between victimization 
and political engagement using panel data, helping to isolate a causal relationship, 
and second, by further determining what factors about victims affect this relation-
ship, if it exists.
I take advantage of the “Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey, Brazil” administered 
in Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul and Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais by Baker, Ames, 
Sokhey & Renno (2015). The survey was administered twice per year in 2002, 
2004, and 2006 as a panel. It includes questions on quality of life, various political 
engagement measures, identification, and victimization. Using this survey allows 
me to test direct causality between witnessing or experiencing crime victimization 
and subsequent political engagement. About 18 % of participants experienced or 
witnessed crime victimization in Wave 4 of the survey3 4. I am able to examine their 
levels of engagement prior to and following this occurrence.
Following my examination of causality, I also consider how victims’ social 
groups and history with discrimination matter. I look at those who have historically 
experienced marginalization, such as certain ethnic or racial groups, women, and 
the socially marginalized, and how their engagement patterns differ from those 
who have not experienced such historical marginalization. Further, I also examine 
differing patterns among those who report experiencing discrimination based on 
their race, gender, neighborhood of residence, or clothing (a proxy for perceived 
3. This is of the individuals who responded to the question soliciting information about victimization 
in Wave 4.
4. Unfortunately, this question does include both victimization and witnessing of crime. However, 
there is precedent in using such questions to explore the effects of crime victimization overall. For ex-
ample, Bateson (2012) and Visconti (2019) both rely on similar (or the same) questions in testing the 
effect of victimization on various variables.
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socoeconomic status)5 versus those who have not. I choose to examine these 
groups as research indicates there are notably different engagement patterns 
among those belonging to different identities and social groups (Desposato & Nor-
rander, 2009) and those who have experienced discrimination (Barreto & Woods, 
2005; Oskooii, 2016). If we are to see shocks to political engagement after victimi-
zation, examining particular groups and populations with such differences should 
be a fruitful place to explore.
To properly examine these effects, I use a difference in difference (DiD) design, 
a quasiexperimental design used to study causal relationships. For each group, and 
its countergroup, I conduct a DiD experiment using victimization as the treatment. 
I examine the effect of this treatment on three different measures of political en-
gagement. I then compare the average treatment effect (ATE) of victimization ex-
perienced by each to its counterpart. For example, I compare the ATE of victimiza-
tion on party engagement levels for Afro-Brazilians to the same ATE but for White 
Brazilians.
Overall, this study results in two main findings: First, there is mixed evidence 
supporting a causal relationship between victimization and engagement. Across 
the entire pooled sample, among the three forms of non-electoral engagement 
examined I only observe an increase in party engagement following victimization. 
This research design thus indicates that victimization is a less robust cause of en-
gagement than previously assumed and the shock of victimization on political en-
gagement is likely mode specific.
However, breaking down the surveyed population to compare various indi-
vidual groupings, including comparing those who live in safe versus unsafe neigh-
borhoods, women versus men, and those who report experiencing discrimination, 
reveals more interesting results. Across subgroups, I see certain groups (i.e., men, 
those who live in safe neighborhoods, the non-poor, White Brazilians, and those 
who have not experience discrimination) experience a positive shock to their en-
gagement following victimization. But, their counterpart groups do not experience 
this shock. However, such results should be interpreted conservatively as confi-
dence intervals of the ATEs for each group overlap in every case, making this con-
clusion only a potential suggestion.
The following sections will proceed as follows. First, I will explore the extant 
literature on political engagement as it relates to engagement based on the sub-
groupings I identify (i.e, gender, race, wealth, neighborhood safety, and experience 
with discrimination). I then explore the relevance of this in the context of Brazil. 
Subsequently, I review my research design and demonstrate my results. I then con-
clude and discuss potential avenues for further research.
5. This measure has been used as a proxy for socioeconomic status in past studies, for example see 
Bueno & Dunning (2017).
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VICTIMIZATION’S THEORIZED EFFECT ON POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
This paper explores the role that victimization plays in affecting one’s political 
engagement. Political engagement has been argued to be quite responsive to vari-
ous individual shocks, one of which is violence. Research across country contexts 
haves argued for a direct link between exposure to violence and an increase in vari-
ous forms of political engagement. In the context of Uganda, exposure to violent 
conflict is shown to increase one’s propensity to vote and participate in community 
organizations, among other measures (Blattman, 2009). But even outside of war-
time scenarios, various scholars argue that personal victimization, such as experi-
encing robbery or a break-in, is associated with heightened political engagement 
in a variety of venues. Bateson (2012) demonstrates this pattern across regions 
using common “barometer” surveys. She shows that victims of crime (or in some 
cases those with family members who were victims) participate more in commu-
nity action, community meetings, protest, town meetings, political meetings, politi-
cal conversations, and group leadership in addition to having higher levels of po-
litical interest and engagement in political persuasion. The fact that these results 
are found across disparate country contexts is indeed compelling. Furthermore, as 
previously discussed this relationship has been examined with regard to both elec-
toral and non-electoral forms of engagement. Although many of these authors ar-
gue for a clear positive relationship between victimization and engagement, there 
is actually much disagreement as to the role that violence and victimization plays in 
influencing both electoral and non-electoral engagement and participation. Some 
argue that violence is in fact demotivating, and in more violent contexts we see less 
electoral and non-electoral engagement (Ley, 2018; Brooks, 2014).
Indeed, regardless of the directionality of this relationship, a crucial component 
of these arguments is that victimization (and/or violence) is temporally prior to en-
gagement levels. That is, exposure to victimization affects engagement (whether 
positively or negatively), making this a causal relationship. These conclusions have 
been made at both the individual (Bateson, 2012; Blattman, 2009; Oosterhoff et 
al., 2018; Brooks, 2014) and community level (Trelles & Carreras, 2012; Ley, 2017; 
Ley, 2018). However, in terms of individual-level arguments, the majority of the 
literature arguing for this causal relationship uses singleyear, cross-sectional 
data. These pieces find correlations between victimization or related themes (e.g., 
perceptions of insecurity) and engagement, with theories that are largely causal. 
However, unfortunately, this cross-sectional data does not allow for causal conclu-
sions as the temporal relationship between the exposure to victimization and the 
engagement levels measured cannot be determined. Thus, the method used to test 
these causal theories does not truly allow for causal conclusions, and rather reveals 
associations between victimization and engagement. These results are still quite 
impressive and useful in the study of political engagement, but there remains some 
ISABEL LATERZO 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND CRIME VICTIMIZATION: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS
| 13 |
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / cc by-nc-nd RLOP. Vol. 10, 1 (2021), 7-37
adjudication to be done. Does violence and victimization truly lead to changes in 
engagement? Or is it just an association explained by other factors? It is possible by 
adding in a temporal element to these examinations, research can determine how 
exactly victimization affects engagement, if at all.
The Role of Context and Individual Identities
In addition to questions about causality and methodology, much extant literature 
leaves out a degree of specificity that is necessary to understand political engagement 
patterns. By no means are all victims the same and neither are their in-groups, such 
as the communities in which they live or the identities to which they belong. Multiple 
streams of research demonstrate that other key factors, apart from victimization, af-
fect engagement patterns. These include community context, individual identities, and 
past experiences. It is possible that such factors influence, or mediate, the supposed 
relationship between victimization and engagement.
One key variable to consider is community context, or the environment in 
which citizens live and participate in politics. Country and community-specific 
engagement literature demonstrates to us that political engagement patterns in 
the context of violence and victimization are not all created equal. For example, 
in both Mexico and Brazil, research indicates citizens’ engagement is mediated by 
the overall level of violence of their communities (Trelles & Carreras, 2012; Bra-
vo & Hernández, 2012; Brooks, 2014; Ley, 2018). Specifically, Trelles & Carreras 
(2012) note that in contexts of high criminal violence, citizens actually abandon 
public channels of engagement. When comparing Mexican municipalities, those 
with higher levels of violence have the lowest levels of voter turnout. This is due 
to disenchantment with the political sphere, or fear of the risks to their safety in 
public places. Further, Brooks (2014) demonstrates that citizens in Brazil who lack 
effective means to protect themselves from victimization become less active citi-
zens. Thus, such research shows us that victimization and violent contexts do not 
always lead to increased engagement.
In addition, we know that individuals of different identities and backgrounds 
have varying patterns of engagement. Although this has not been often applied to 
the context of crime victimization, there is reason to believe that different kinds 
of victims might respond in distinct manners to victimization. There is evidence, 
for example, that individuals of different gender identities, ethnic and racial back-
grounds, and socioeconomic status have various patterns of engagement, particu-
larly in contexts of insecurity and violence. Furthermore, individuals who have ex-
perienced a history of discrimination on the basis of these traits and identities also 
behave differently in the realm of engagement.
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With regard to gender, research demonstrates that violence has clear, gen-
dered effects on political engagement. For example, Hadzic & Tavits (2019) show 
that violence increases engagement among men while reducing it among women, 
specifically in the context of a post-conflict society. Bardall, Bjarnegård & Piscopo 
(2020) argue that violence can have varied gendered impacts for a variety of rea-
sons. Even if conflict or violence is not explicitly motivated by gender, women may 
find violence to be particularly threatening. If we consider the gendered nature of 
one’s political opportunity structure, women may be more risk-averse compared 
to men in politics, as they feel more vulnerable and responsible for caring for their 
families. Furthermore, we see in Latin America specifically that a gender-gap exists 
across forms of electoral and non-electoral politics, even without considering the 
influence of victimization. Across country contexts, women tend to participate less 
than men, although the size of this gap depends on a variety of factors (e.g., age, 
employment) (Desposato & Norrander, 2009).
In addition, significant scholarly work demonstrates differing patterns of political 
engagement among distinct racial and ethnic identities. The variance in such patterns 
can be described by multiple factors, including socioeconomic status, psychologi-
cal resources, social and societal connectedness, group identity and consciousness, 
and group (or inter-group) conflict (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999). Such patterns exist in 
Latin America as well, where research has shown White individuals tend to partici-
pate more in political associations compared to their Black counterparts. However, 
socioeconomic status can have a mediating effect – a White individual’s propensity 
to participate politically is more affected by income than a similar Black individual’s 
propensity (Bueno & Fialho, 2009). The intersection of race, ethnicity and victimi-
zation, however, has only been minimally explored. But, there is reason to believe 
victimization might affect individuals of different racial and ethnic identities in dis-
tinct manners. For example, we know that violence, particularly that which has racial 
undertones, has been shown to affect other political behavior outcomes (e.g., vote 
choice) in distinct ways across such groups (Hadzic et al., 2020).
Finally, we also know one important individual-level factor that can influence 
one’s political engagement is socioeconomic status (SES). Brady, Verba & Schloz-
man (1995) have argued, for example, that those of lower SES often participate 
less, as they have fewer resources key to engagement – time, money, and civic 
skills. More recent research has echoed such results, showing that those of lower 
SES tend to participate at lower levels, but with some nuance. The inequality of 
a society interacts with important SES components, such as income. Particularly 
in the realm of unconventional political engagement, income negatively interacts 
with inequality explaining why we see those of lower SES participating more in un-
conventional forms of politics (e.g., protest) as compared to conventional politics 
(e.g., voting) (Cicatiello, Ercolano & Gaeta, 2015). Violence and economic insecu-
rity also have an important and dynamic relationship. Brooks (2014) argues that it 
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is not necessarily the poorest individuals who do not participate, but a wider cat-
egory of the insecure. She argues that even those who live just above the poverty 
line, but do not have sufficient resources to adequately “hedge alone the risks of 
everyday life”, including criminal threats, are less likely to participate politically.
In addition to differing patterns of engagement based on these outlined identi-
ties and factors, individuals corresponding to these groups often face discrimina-
tion. Political discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic sta-
tus, or neighborhood of residence can lead to changes in engagement as well. Many 
scholars contend that political discrimination, particularly by political institutions, 
can motivate political engagement (Barreto & Woods, 2005; Oskooii, 2016). Im-
portantly, however, societal discrimination can have differing effects – perceptions 
of society based discrimination can lead to increases in in-group political engage-
ment (e.g., community organizations) but decreased participation in mainstream 
arenas (e.g., electoral participation) (Oskooii, 2016; Oskooii, 2020). Other studies 
also show that perceptions of discrimination against oneself can lead to decreased 
voter registration and voting (Schildkraut, 2005). Thus, the effect of discrimination 
on engagement is more difficult to parse apart. It has yet to be explored particu-
larly in the context of victimization.
Theoretical Expectations
In this analysis, I seek to re-test previous arguments about the effect of victimi-
zation on political engagement. In particular, I re-examine this relationship in light 
of two main contentions I present. First, a research design that allows for a better 
causal argument to be tested at the individual level is needed. Thus, I leverage a panel 
survey in the context of Brazil to be able to ensure the “treatment” of victimization is 
temporally prior to any subsequent engagement observed. Second, I break down the 
population into various subgroups to understand how such groups might experience 
a change in their engagement following victimization differently. Because of the vari-
ous factors discussed above, such as access to resources and possible risk-aversion 
among various groups, if a relationship exists between victimization and engage-
ment, it should be most visible when parsing apart respondents by such factors.
When examining one’s neighborhood context, previous research suggests a 
clear relationship. The insecurity of one’s community should lead individuals to 
abstain from political engagement, possibly out of fear of further exposure to vio-
lence. Thus, we should expect that victimization for those living in insecure neigh-
borhoods should not serve as a substantial shock to engagement. In other words, 
the effect of the treatment (victimization) in unsafe neighborhoods should produce 
little effect. Rather, it is more plausible that this shock is present among residents 
who live in safe neighborhoods.
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In terms of sociodemographic characteristics, we should expect certain clear 
relationships. Based on previously discussed literature, it seems women not only 
participate in politics less overall compared to men, but detract from the political 
arena when exposed to violence. If women are truly more risk-averse than men 
and participate less in contexts of violence, we should not see a shock to their en-
gagement following victimization, while we should expect to see one among men.
In terms of race and ethnicity, there is clear evidence that racial and ethnic 
groups which have been historically marginalized (e.g., those of indigenous or Afri-
can descent in the case of Brazil) tend to participate less in politics. Although there 
has been little analysis connecting engagement patterns and victimization among 
different ethnic and racial identities, I expect certain patterns to hold following vic-
timization. That is, victimization should not serve as a meaningful shock to political 
engagement among individuals of historically marginalized ethnicities and races. 
Given that such groups typically have fewer resources at their disposal to engage 
in politics (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999), feel political systems are unfair and unrespon-
sive to their needs (Flesken & Hartl, 2020), and have lower sense of belonging in a 
system (Williams, 2000) we should not see an increase in engagement following 
victimization. Rather, such a shock might be present across groups that have not 
historically experienced marginalization, such as White individuals. In the context 
of this research, I particularly explore the difference in engagement levels of White 
and Afro-Brazilians. The former group has experienced clear privilege, access to 
resources, and political representation in Brazil while the latter continues to expe-
rience a lack of representation and marginalization by the state and society (Telles, 
2007; Janusz & Campos, 2018).
Further, those of lower SES are also unlikely to increase their engagement 
following victimization. As articulated by Brooks (2014), it is particularly those 
at the intersection of economic and physical insecurity who participate the least 
in politics. However, this could be engagement-mode specific, as evidence does 
show higher levels of engagement in more informal modes of political engagement 
among the poor.
When examining the role of discrimination, it is less clear what relationship we 
should expect. Past research shows that discrimination can both lead to increased 
and decreased engagement levels. Further, there has been little research that ex-
amines if violence or insecurity affects those who have experienced victimization 
in a distinct manner. Thus, this study hopes to adjudicate how violence might influ-
ence engagement among individuals who have experienced discrimination, wheth-
er it be on the basis of their race, gender, socioeconomic status, or neighborhood of 
residence. It is possible that such individuals experience an increase or decrease in 
engagement compared to those who have not experienced discrimination. It is also 
possible there is no effect at all.
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Brazil and Panel Survey Contexts
As previously discussed, Brazil represents a country plagued by high, and in-
creasing, levels of violence. Between 2000 and 2017, the homicide rate in Brazil 
grew from 23.7 to 30.5 intentional homicides per 100,000 people. The global av-
erage in 2017 was only 6.1 per 100,000 people (Data UNODC, 2017). Homicide 
levels do not even capture rates of other crimes, although they suggest that crime 
throughout Brazil is quite high. Feelings of insecurity as well are quite high, with 
only 36 % of individuals stating they feel safe walking alone at night. This is par-
ticularly concerning compared to regional neighbors, such as Mexico (42 % of indi-
viduals feel safe walking alone at night), Colombia (44 %), and Chile (48 %) (OECD 
Better Life Index, 2020).
Here, I utilize panel data collected from two Brazilian cities – Juiz de Fora in 
the state of Minas Gerais and Caxias do Sul in Rio Grande do Sul. During the pe-
riod of this survey, these cities were quite similar in terms of demographics and 
economics. In terms of security, both Juiz de Fora and Caxias do Sul represent cit-
ies of relatively middling levels of security within Brazil. Juiz de Fora had a rate 
of 22 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants in 2015 while Caxias do Sul had a 
rate of 24.2 per 100 thousand inhabitants (Cerqueira et al., 2017). Both are slightly 
below the national average of 28.9 per 100 thousand inhabitants, but well above 
the global average of 5.9 per 100 thousand inhabitants (Data UNODC, 2017; Cer-
queira et al., 2017).
In terms of the explanatory power of this case, the two cities are arguably 
comparable to contexts where crime is certainly present, but not the dominant 
narrative of many citizens day-to-day lives. It is quite possible one could compare 
these to other urban areas in Latin America, although they do not represent the 
security reality of cities known to experience extremely high crime rates, such as 
São Paulo or Salvador. These cities might be considered more comparable to other 
mid-sized Latin American cities with similar levels of crime, such as Cartagena, Co-
lombia. Furthermore, there is notable variation within each city in terms of crime 
and safety, as is the case in many urban areas. Among participants of the Two-City 
Six-Wave survey, 40 % of Juiz de Fora residents and 47 % of Caxias do Sul resi-
dents reported feeling “not very safe” in their communities. Thus, overall Juiz de 
Fora and Caxias do Sul represent cases of intermediate to high levels of crime, al-
though there is notable variation within each city. In such contexts, the jury is still 
out regarding what type of relationship we might expect between victimization 
and engagement. Residents in the two cities likely have less exposure to violence 
than those in post-conflict societies, where Blattman (2009) finds a positive rela-
tionship between victimization and engagement exists. But, it is very possible we 
will see variation in the effect based on differences in among community safety, as 
noted by Ley (2018) and Brooks (2014), who see that more insecure environments 
ISABEL LATERZO 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND CRIME VICTIMIZATION: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS
| 18 |
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / cc by-nc-nd RLOP. Vol. 10, 1 (2021), 7-37
can preclude engagement. Thus, the context of Brazil and the two cities included 
in this panel provide a suitable environment to parse apart Some of the potential 
effects of victimization on engagement.
ANALYSIS
To determine if the relationship between victimization and political engage-
ment is causal, and how one’s personal identity, neighborhood context, or history 
with discrimination might influence this relationship, as mentioned I take advan-
tage of the Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey, Brazil (Baker et al., 2015). Using this 
survey, I conduct a difference in difference (DiD) analysis on selected political en-
gagement variables. I also replicate a portion of Bateson (2012)’s analysis, as ex-
plored below and in the online Appendix.
Data and Research Design
The Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey was administered in six waves during 
three different years (2002, 2004, and 2006) using a representative sample from 
the two cities, totaling about 25,000 interviews. The panel-nature of this survey 
allows me to establish causality in my hypothesis testing. I am able to isolate the 
level of political engagement of respondents before and after treatment. To meas-
ure my treatment, victimization or exposure to victimization, I rely on a question 
administered in Wave 4 of the survey, which asks (translated from Portuguese): “... 
Have you witnessed or been the victim of a crime, such as robbery, theft, or assault, 
in the last 12 months? Yes or no?”6. Panel-structured data is particularly valuable 
as it allows us to track the same individuals and isolate the individual-level effect of 
a treatment on a specific outcome. This stands in contrast to cross-sectional data 
where, due to only having access to an individual at one point in time, conclusions 
are often made by grouping similar individuals and finding associations between 
variables of interest. However, these surveys do not allow for the identification 
of causal, over-time patterns among these individuals. It is argued that to prop-
erly isolate causal patterns, temporal priority is a necessary condition. That is to 
6. As previously noted, unfortunately, this question does include both victimization and witnessing of 
crime, which arguably can introduce noise into the variable. However, there is precedent in using such 
questions to explore the effects of crime victimization overall. For example, Bateson (2012) and Vis-
conti (2019) both rely on similar (or the same) questions in testing the effect of victimization on various 
variables. In particular Visconti (2019) uses this question from this panel survey to make conclusions 
about the policy preferences of victims, and is able to find strong results.
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say, the cause must occur prior to the effect (Wunsch, Russo & Mouchart, 2010). 
Unfortunately, with cross-sectional individual data, this necessary condition can-
not be guaranteed. However, by using a panel survey that interviews the same re-
spondents in each wave, and collects information about political engagement both 
pre- and post-treatment, I can guarantee this condition.
To measure political engagement, I examine three forms of non-electoral en-
gagement: participation in political party meetings, participation in community as-
sociations7, and engagement in political conversations8. 
Non-electoral engagement measures are most appropriate for this study for 
two main reasons. First, the survey enquires about respondents’ non-electoral 
engagement patterns before and after victimization (which I use as a treatment), 
allowing it to be experimentally assessed. In terms of electoral engagement, the 
survey predominantly focuses on vote choice rather than including explicit meas-
ures for turnout. Further, assessing voter turnout from surveys is problematic. Re-
search consistently shows that surveyed voter turnout does not accurately predict 
true turnout, and is rather subject to significant social desirability bias (Granberg 
& Holmberg, 1991; Karp & Brockington, 2005). Finally, voting in Brazil is compul-
sory, although the degree to which citizens abide by this law is inconsistent (Power, 
2009). Thus, measuring changes in voter turnout in Brazil is likely subject to signifi-
cant noise and the influence of exogenous factors. Due to these factors, electoral 
turnout as a measure of political engagement in this context is not appropriate; 
non-electoral measures provide more internally and externally consistent meas-
ures of engagement.
To code respondents of different identities, social groups, and those who have 
(not) experienced discrimination, I proceed as follows. Males and females are sim-
ply separated by their reported sex on the survey. Afro-Brazilians are coded as 
those who self-report as “Black” or “Brown,” while White Brazilians are those who 
self-report as “White”. I choose to code the poor as those whose monthly income 
is below the poverty line. In Brazil, this is bellow 324 Reais per month (converted 
7. In particular, and as shown in the online Appendix, the question used to measure participation in 
community associations asks individuals about their frequency of participation in meetings of their “As-
sociacão de Moradores” or community associations (alternatively, residents’ associations). In Brazil, 
these associations frequently deal with political matters and work to improve community life in their 
area. They work on matters such as police presence, schooling, and infrastructure and frequently liaise 
with public officials, such as the mayors. In times of limited government action, they have also served 
essential roles in keeping communities safe and combatting misinformation (Watson, 2020). Scholarly 
work has previously documented their political ties, for example, see Gay (1990).
8. Of course, there are other forms of non-electoral engagement that might be affected. These meas-
ures are chosen because respondents were surveyed about their behavior before and after victimiza-
tion, thus they permit the DiD design. Furthermore, these variables have ordinal outcomes, while some 
other measures which are surveyed have only binary outcomes. As explained in the Analysis section and 
the online Appendix, binary outcomes require a logit model, which is not well suited for a DiD design.
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from the international poverty line of $1.90 per day). To isolate those who live in 
the most insecure neighborhoods, I rely on a question which asks respondents to 
rate their perception of their neighborhood’s safety from very safe to very unsafe. 
I isolate those who self-report residing in “very unsafe” neighborhoods as belong-
ing to the most neighborhood-insecure group, while others are coded as more 
neighborhood-secure. In terms of discrimination, I isolate those who report being 
subject to discrimination based on gender, race, neighborhood of residence, and 
clothing worn. Clothing serves as a proxy for perceived socioeconomic status by 
the discriminator9. 
I also employ certain strategies to ensure that my analysis has the most ef-
fective, and least biased, design. On its own, the panel survey allows for certain 
measures typically unavailable in non-panel surveys. Typically, researchers can-
not adjust on pre-treatment covariates, as it is unclear whether covariates were 
influenced prior post-treatment. The panel allows me to adjust the data on co-
variates captured before the respondents experienced treatment (in this case, vic-
timization). I do so by including pre-treatment measures of my outcome variables 
of interest (various political engagement measures) and compare them to such 
measures post-treatment. This corrects for various biases that adjusting for post-
treatment characteristics can introduce (Rosenbaum, 1984; Rosenbaum, 2015). 
To do so, I isolate three variables measured before and after the treatment. These 
are: political party participation, engagement in group political conversations, and 
participation in one’s community association. These variables serve as my outcome 
variables of interest. Each is measured in as an ordinal variable, from low levels of 
engagement to high.
Further, it is important that both treated and control groups compared in the 
models are similar in terms of covariate composition. Both groups should have 
comparable individuals with a similar balance of pre-treatment characteristics. As 
seen in Table 1, the proportion of victims vs. non-victims across various subgroups 
is not substantial. However, this does not capture possible other skewed charac-
teristics of these groups, such as level of education or income. To ensure that both 
treated and control groups are balanced not only in treatment status, but across a 
range of important covariates, I create a matched data set. To do so, I take advan-
tage of the MatchIt package (Stuart et al., 2011) to pre-process the panel data with 
a nonparametic matching method. This method is based on the idea that the treat-
ment variable is not randomly assigned.
To correct for this nonrandom assignment, I employ MatchIt’s “nearest neigh-
bor” matching method, which selects the best control matches for each treated 
individual. I specify for the MatchIt function to use Mahalanobis distance, an 
9. This measure has been used as a proxy by other authors, such as Bueno & Dunning (2017).
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alternative method to propensity score matching. I choose this method, as com-
pared to propensity score matching, as the popular latter method has been shown 
to increase imbalance, inefficiency, model dependence, and bias (King & Nielson, 
2019). Using this technique, I create a sample that is balanced across pre-treat-
ment covariates and is even in its distribution of both treated and control observa-
tions. Similar matching approaches have been used in other analyses observing the 
effect of victimization utilizing this data, and have generated robust and unbiased 
results (e.g., Visconti, 2019). The balance across used pre-treatment covariates of 
the matched data set can be seen in the online Appendix.
Table 1. Subgroups by Victimization
Status Female Males Afro-Braz. White Poor Non-Poor Unsafe Safe
Vic./Witness 288 277 130 274 198 481 189 491
Non-Vic/Witness 1260 969 616 1194 986 2051 639 2157
Percent Vic 19 % 22 % 17 % 19 % 17 % 19 % 23 % 19 %
Source: Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey, Brazil (Baker et al., 2015).
Finally, the panel also suffers from a fair degree of missing data. This is com-
mon in panel data sets, as attrition rates and response missingness can be quite 
high. To accommodate for this absent data, I employ a multiple imputation method, 
Amelia II, developed by Honaker et al. (2011). This statistical package multiply im-
putes missing data by implementing a bootstrapping-based algorithm. It improves 
upon other methods used to handle missing data, such as listwise deletion or mean 
substitution, by filling in data in a manner that does not compromise any true re-
lationship in the data. Rather, it allows me to include observed data from partially 
missing rows, whose previous missingness would impede any model from utilizing 
them. Thus, Amelia II also helps to overcome bias from missingness within the sam-
ple as well. Using this method, I create five “completed” data sets of missing values. 
Each set is filled with different imputations that allow me to incorporate the un-
certainty of the missing data, and better infer results from these various iterations. 
These five imputed sets are then used for each model (specified below). I conduct 
each model five times, once on each set, and average their outputs to get the most 
accurate result10. 
10. I impute the data sets prior to engaging in matching, as the matching process employed by MatchIt 
strictly requires no missing data.
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ESTIMATION
To estimate the effect of crime victimization on political engagement, I use a DiD 
estimator and use data from all six waves of the Two-City, Six-Wave Panel survey. I 
choose three ordinal measures of political engagement: political party participation, 
engagement in political conversations, and participation in community associations. 
All three measures were similarly used by Bateson (2012) to gauge engagement 
as well. For each measure, individuals were asked if they engage in these activities 
“never”, “rarely”, “at times”, or “frequently”. To measure the effect of victimization on 
these two variables, I run the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model:
Vit represents the level of a certain type of engagement for individual i at time t. 
Tt is a dummy time variable that equals 1 for waves 4 through 6 and 0 for waves 
1 through 3, where the treatment begins at wave 4. Vit is the treatment variable 
which equals 1 for individuals who witnessed or experienced crime victimization 
within 12 months prior to wave 4. It equals 0 for those who did not experience this 
treatment. These two variables, Tt and Vit are then interacted to produce the coef-
ficient ρ. ρ represents the average treatment effect (ATE) of the treatment on indi-
vidual political engagement outcomes over time. Cit is a vector of control variables, 
which depend on the nature of the exact model I run (this is explored below). To run 
the model appropriately for each group, and to control for potential membership in 
multiple groups, I specify control variables as follows for each model (for full coding 
procedure, see the online Appendix):
·	 Gender (Male vs. Female): Age, ideology (right), race (White), monthly in-
come below poverty line, residence in an unsafe neighborhood
·	 Race (Afro-Brazilian vs. White): Age, ideology (right), gender (female), 
monthly income below poverty line, residence in an unsafe neighborhood
·	 Wealth (Poor vs. Non-Poor): Age, ideology (right), gender (female), race 
(White), residence in an unsafe neighborhood
·	 Neighborhood Safety (Safe vs. Unsafe): Age, ideology (right), gender (fe-
male), race (White), monthly income below poverty line
·	 Gender-Based Discrimination (Experienced vs. Not Experienced Discrim-
ination): Age, ideology (right), race (White), monthly income below poverty 
line, residence in an unsafe neighborhood
·	 Racial Discrimination (Experienced vs. Not Experienced Discrimination): 
Age, ideology (right), gender (female), monthly income below poverty line, 
residence in an unsafe neighborhood
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·	 Wealth-Based Discrimination (Experienced vs. Not Experienced Discrim-
ination): Age, ideology (right), gender (female), race (White), residence in an 
unsafe neighborhood
·	 Neighborhood-Based Discrimination (Experienced vs. Not Experienced 
Discrimination): Age, ideology (right), gender (female), race (White), 
monthly income below poverty line
Each measure of political engagement is tested for each pair above. In addition, 
I run a series of models without separating respondents into each group. The intent 
here is to re-test the original hypothesis that victimization leads to an increase in 
political engagement, but with data and a method allowing for a true test of causal-
ity. In the following section, I present the results of my tests.
RESULTS
Overall Effect of Victimization on Political Engagement
First, I examine if there is an effect of victimization on political engagement for 
the pooled group of respondents, without parsing apart subgroups. 
Figure 1. Average Treatment Effect of Victimization on Political Engagement 
(All Groups)
Source: Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey, Brazil (Baker et al., 2015)  
and Author’s Own Elaboration.
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As previously discussed, Bateson (2012) posits that victimization leads to an 
increase in political engagement, across a variety of forms, using single year cross-
sectional data. I test this relationship with a panel data set to see if this effect truly 
is causal, particularly in the context of Brazil. As seen in Figure 1, there is some 
evidence supporting this effect, although it is limited. I find that victimization has 
a positive effect on political party meeting attendance, but does not have an effect 
on other forms of non-electoral engagement. Figure 1 presents the average treat-
ment effect (ATE) of victimization on engagement, along with 95 % confidence 
intervals for each estimation. Further, Tables 2 through 4 show the regression re-
sults for each model. These results are averages of the results gleaned from the 
same model tested on five Amelia II imputed data sets, as discussed above.
Table 2. Difference in Difference Estimation for Effect of Victimization on 
Political Conversations (Pooled)
Coefficient Stand. Error P Value
Intercept 1.866 0.103 0.000
DID 0.161 0.095 0.089
Time 0.122 0.076 0.108
Treated 0.025 0.078 0.750
Ideology: Right -0.226 0.048 0.000
Below Pov. Line -0.195 0.078 0.012
Race: White -0.042 0.045 0.348
Not Safe -0.034 0.056 0.543
Female -0.242 0.050 0.000
Age -0.004 0.001 0.005
Adj R2: 0.047
Observations: 5 Amelia Imputed Sets (n = 1026)
Source: Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey, Brazil (Baker et al., 2015) and Author’s Own 
Elaboration.
All results coded as binary list relevant categories coded as 1, demonstrating 
the effect of the category on the outcome variable. The following variables are 
binary: Ideology: Right; Below Pov. Line; Race: White; Not Safe; Female. Age is a 
ISABEL LATERZO 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND CRIME VICTIMIZATION: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS
| 25 |
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / cc by-nc-nd RLOP. Vol. 10, 1 (2021), 7-37
continuous variable. Full coding procedure and reference categories are included 
in the online Appendix.
Table 3. Difference in Difference Estimation for Effect of Victimization on Party 
Engagement (Pooled)
Coefficient Stand. Error P Value
Intercept 0.046 0.044 0.296
DID 0.102 0.038 0.008
Time 0.020 0.028 0.467
Treated 0.016 0.029 0.571
Ideology: Right -0.050 0.026 0.053
Below Pov. Line 0.014 0.031 0.645
Race: White 0.030 0.023 0.191
Not Safe 0.013 0.028 0.636
Female -0.048 0.021 0.027
Age 0.001 0.001 0.114
Adj R2: 0.023
Observations: 5 Amelia Imputed Sets (n = 1026)
Source: Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey, Brazil (Baker et al., 2015) and Author’s Own 
Elaboration.
These results also lead one to question whether or not the originally posited 
correlations exist in just the context of Brazil. To determine if this association does 
exist, irrespective of causality, I replicate Bateson (2012)’s findings with data from 
the 2007 round of AmericasBarometer for Brazil (AmericasBarometer, 2020)11. 
The findings can be seen in Table 5.
11. This round of LAPOP was in the field between 2006 and 2007, for ease I refer to it as the 2007 
round.
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Table 4. Difference in Difference Estimation for Effect of Victimization on 
Community Association Participation (Pooled)
Coefficient Stand. Error P Value
Intercept 0.053 0.055 0.335
DID 0.001 0.050 0.980
Time -0.025 0.037 0.503
Treated 0.016 0.039 0.677
Ideology: Right 0.021 0.032 0.502
Below Pov. Line 0.053 0.050 0.284
Race: White 0.078 0.026 0.002
Not Safe 0.002 0.032 0.960
Female 0.009 0.027 0.738
Age 0.004 0.001 0.000
Adj R2: 0.014
Observations: 5 Amelia Imputed Sets (n = 1026)
Source: Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey, Brazil (Baker et al., 2015) and Author’s Own 
Elaboration.
For full details of the replication, see the online Appendix. The results of this 
OLS regression show that the DiD results hold when examining the entire national 
context of Brazil using cross-sectional data. Out of the five forms of political en-
gagement tested, only participation in political meetings has a positive relationship 
with victimization. Crime victimization seems to have no relationship with commu-
nity action, participation in community meetings, protest, nor interest in politics. 
The fact that I find this effect, and correlation, between victimization and engage-
ment only holds when examining participation in political meetings suggests we 
must think much harder about under what circumstances this overall relationship 
exists12. But, it does suggest there seems to be a relationship between victimiza-
tion and engagement in political parties that is worth exploration. 
12. In addition, I replicate these findings using 2010 AmericasBarometer data from Brazil. This is the 
same data used by Bateson in her aggregate analysis of Latin America, but without the addition of other 
countries. The results, which can be found in the online Appendix, show slightly different results. In 
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* p<0.1; ** p< 0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: LAPOP 2007 and Author’s Own Elaboration.
EXPLORING SUBGROUPS
The above evidence indicates that there is only a causal relationship between 
victimization and participation in political party meetings, and that no relationship 
exists among the other two measures in Brazil. However, it is still possible that 
further results exist when I examine varying contexts, group identities, and expe-
riences among the sample population. For example, individuals of identities that 
addition, it includes further variables which appear in the 2010 round of the survey, but were not yet 
included in the 2006/2007 round.
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have seen a history of government responsiveness, such as males or the socioeco-
nomically advantaged, could experience a shock to their engagement following vic-
timization. Further, we might see a reduction in political engagement among other 
subgroups.
The results provided in this section show that, upon further analysis, it seems 
that individuals of differing subgroups respond to victimization in distinct ways. 
In Figures 2 through 9, I again present the ATE for victimization on each selected 
mode of political engagement with 95 % confidence intervals. However, in these 
figures they are separated by subgroup (e.g., gender is separated by male vs. fe-
male, neighborhood by safe vs. unsafe, and so forth). The coefficients, standard er-
rors, and p-values for each model can be found in the online Appendix.
A portion of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant, suggesting 
a shock in engagement following victimization. However, the confidence intervals 
for each group always overlap. This suggests that although there is reason to be-
lieve certain subgroups might experience stronger shocks to engagement follow-
ing victimization, further testing must be done to determine if the difference be-
tween the two groups is significant and noteworthy.
Select measures show ATEs of statistical significance. Interestingly, although 
there was no ATE of victimization on political conversations in the pooled sample, 
we see White Brazilians are more likely to engage in political conversations after 
victimization. However, this was not true of Afro-Brazilians. These results must 
be interpreted carefully: for White Brazilians, the results are statistically signifi-
cant. Yet, while results are different from zero, they are not statistically different 
from the ATE for Afro-Brazilians. Similarly, we see that residents of safe neighbor-
hoods do experience a positive shock to their participation in political party meet-
ings, while those who reside in unsafe neighborhoods do not (Figure 5). Men also 
experience this same shock to their engagement, while women do not (Figure 2). 
Again, the confidence intervals for each group overlap, but this suggests that at 
minimum those residing in safe neighborhoods are driving the effect seen in the 
pooled sample.
When examining the role of discrimination, we see some interesting results as 
well. Each group that experienced no discrimination on the basis of gender, race, 
clothing (socioeconomic status), or neighborhood of residence see a positive and 
statistically significant shock to their participation in political party meetings (Fig-
ures 6-9). However, again the confidence intervals do overlap with those corre-
sponding to the ATE of of indviduals who report no discrimination. Among the oth-
er two forms of engagement, no statistically significant effect is seen among both 
those who experienced or did not experience discrimination.
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Figure 2. DID Estimation of 
Victimization and Gender
Figure 3. DID Estimation of 
Victimization and Race
Figure 4. DID Estimation of 
Victimization and Poverty
Figure 5. DID Estimation of 
Victimization and Neighborhood
Source: Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey, Brazil (Baker et al., 2015) and Author’s Own 
Elaboration.
Overall, the results show some support for the expected relationships between 
neighborhood of residence and various individual identities in terms of the role 
that victimization plays in affecting engagement. Further, we see some evidence 
that those who do not report experiencing discrimination do experience a positive 
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shock to their participation in political party meetings, while those who do report 
experiencing discrimination do not see such an effect.
Figure 6. DID Estimation of 
Victimization and Gender-Based 
Discrimination
Figure 7. DID Estimation of 
Victimization and Race-Based 
Discrimination
Figure 8. DID Estimation of 
Victimization and Poverty-Based 
Discrimination (Clothes Proxy)
Figure 9. DID Estimation of 
Victimization and Neighborhood-Based 
Discrimination
Source: Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey, Brazil (Baker et al., 2015) and Author’s Own 
Elaboration.
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DISCUSSION
It has been widely hypothesized that victimization or exposure to violence can 
impact citizens’ political engagement. However, most evidence in support of this 
hypothesis has relied on survey data that, strictly speaking, can only show an asso-
ciational relationship. Using data from the Two-City Six-Wave panel survey (Baker 
et al., 2015) administered in Brazil between 2002 and 2006, I set out to examine 
this hypothesis in a way that can better adjudicate if there is indeed a causal re-
lationship between victimization and engagement. The findings from this analysis 
reveal various noteworthy points worthy of further discussion.
First, past analyses examining the relationship between victimization and po-
litical engagement have, in multiple cases, revealed clear, statistically significant 
relationships between these variables. In many of these studies, these results are 
framed as causal (with victimization impacting engagement). My analysis calls into 
question both the association between these variables and their causal relation-
ship in the context of Brazil. In particular, I find that this relationship seems to be 
participation mode specific in Brazil. There is no causal relationship between vic-
timization and two important measures of political engagement – participation in 
community associations (the Associação de Moradores do Barrio, in Brazil) and 
engagement in political conversations. In previous studies which rely on non-panel 
survey data, such as Bateson (2012), it is argued that there is a causal relationship 
between these variables. However, I do find evidence for a causal relationship be-
tween victimization and engagement in political party meetings. My results and 
analysis strategy overall suggest that we need more, ideally panel, studies of the 
relationships between victimization and different types of political engagement.
There are various possible explanations. First, it could be that participation in 
party meetings is a type of engagement that attracts a certain group of individu-
als who are more likely to participate and seek change after victimization; this is 
supported by past work examining political engagement patterns among different 
types of citizens (Li & Marsh, 2008). It is also possible that participating in politi-
cal party meetings is perceived to elicit change relevant to reducing crime, thus 
resulting in an increased response in this domain. Further, it could be other spe-
cific factors relevant to each participation domain which might vary across country 
contexts (Bennett, Flickinger & Rhine, 2000; Vráblíková, 2014).
In examining this result further, it is evident that there are significantly fewer 
people, both prior to and following possible victimization, that engage in political 
party meetings. Across relevant waves, we see on average 9 percent of individuals 
participating in political party meetings (increase from 7 to 11 percent from Wave 
1 to Wave 4). This is significantly lower than engagement in both neighborhood 
association meetings and political conversations, with about 20 and 79 percent 
of respondents on average, respectively, reporting participation across waves. 
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Participation in neighborhood associations barely changed across waves, while 
engagement in political conversations increased by about 11 percent13. Howev-
er, such changes are across both victims and non-victims, thus do not represent 
changes in response to the treatment. 
This lower level of overall participation in political party meetings might be a 
clue to understand why we see an effect of victimization present only with respect 
to this mode of engagement. It is possible that individuals who choose to participate 
in party meetings are more politically knowledgeable, savvy, and/or engaged over-
all. Following victimization, they may see value in attending such meetings to insti-
gate change in the political system; for others this may not be the case. However, 
more research into the differences between these populations and the exact mo-
tivations for increased engagement must be explored to identify this mechanism.
Furthermore, the analyses of subgroups indicates that the effect of victimiza-
tion on participation in political party meetings is largely driven by men and resi-
dents of safe neighborhoods. In addition, it seems that those who have not expe-
rienced discrimination on the basis of gender, race, poverty, nor neighborhood of 
residence also contribute to this effect (Figures 2-9). Thus, there might be further 
factors related to this population that explain why we see increased participation 
in party meetings among them following victimization, but not among others. As 
discussed earlier, there are clearly different engagement patterns among such 
populations, but these have been explored very little in the context of victimization. 
Varying engagement patterns could be driven by factors related to represen-
tation in political parties. For example, at the time of the survey utilized here, wom-
en in Brazil saw little representation in political office (Miguel, 2008). Quotas were 
introduced to ameliorate this, with some effects. It is possible that certain groups, 
such as women, do not increase their participation in parties after victimization due 
to barriers to entry and possible lack of participation among their ingroup. Others 
however, such as men and those who have not experienced discrimination, might 
see political parties as a viable option to instigate change. In addition to these re-
sults regarding participation in political party meetings, the disaggregated analysis 
revealed differences among White versus Afro-Brazilians in political conversa-
tions, an effect masked by the pooled sample. White Brazilians in the survey sample 
increase their engagement in political conversations following victimization, while 
this effect does not exist for Afro-Brazilians. Notably, the confidence intervals of 
the ATEs once again overlap, but the result nonetheless suggests future investiga-
tion should be conducted to explore patterns of political conversation following 
13. Neighborhood association participation is recorded to be 20.4 percent in Wave 1, 20.6 percent in 
Wave 4, and 20.3 percent in Wave 5. Engagement in political conversations is recorded to be 71.8 per-
cent in Wave 1, 80.5 percent in Wave 4, 81.3 percent in Wave 5, and 82.7 percent in Wave 4. This is irre-
spective of the level of participation, and only accounts for a participation level of greater than “never.”
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victimization. In addition to varying results among subgroups for participation in 
political party meetings, this result further suggests that various subgroups of the 
population engage in politics differently following victimization.
It is also worth noting that certain control variables were included in this analy-
sis which were not incorporated in some other previous scholarly work. Namely, 
although (Bateson, 2012) includes a variety of controls in her analysis, such as so-
cioeconomic status and age, race and/or ethnic identity is not included. The analy-
sis here suggests this is an important factor to consider when examining the effect 
of victimization on political engagement. Furthermore, few analyses on this topic 
have considered the role of discrimination. The results presented here also suggest 
that discrimination should be considered an important factor worth including in 
future analyses on the political ramifications of violence. Finally, this analysis sug-
gests that country context is of paramount importance. Many previous studies do 
take a within-country research approach (Brooks, 2014; Blattman, 2009; Trelles & 
Carreras, 2012; Ley, 2018), and this study confirms this may be the most prudent 
method. Apart from contrasting causal findings, the replication analysis included 
also suggests that associational relationships in Brazil differ from results found at 
the regional level. That is to say, although pooled analyses of Latin America (and 
other regions) point to associational relationships between victimization and many 
forms of engagement, when examining just the Brazilian context, many of these 
relationships do not hold. This causal analysis also supports this finding.
CONCLUSION
Previous research on victimization and political engagement has seen substan-
tial disagreement about the relationship between these two factors. Among both 
those studying electoral and non-electoral engagement, there are conflicting argu-
ments regarding how violence and victimization affect citizens’ engagement. Some 
argue it positively affects engagement, resulting in heightened engagement across 
modes such as protest, community association involvement, and even voting (e.g., 
Bateson, 2012; Oosterhoff et al., 2018; Blattman, 2009). Others have argued that 
the relationship between violence and engagement is actually negative; those who 
experience violence or victimization in fact engage less in politics (e.g., Trelles & 
Carreras, 2012; Brooks, 2014; Ley, 2018). In this paper, I seek to bring more clar-
ity to this debate in two main ways. First, I re-test the effect of victimization on 
engagement in a clearly causal manner by utilizing individual-level panel data and a 
difference-in-difference design. This method allows me to make causal conclusions 
about how exactly one’s victimization experience affects political engagement. In 
particular, I examine non-electoral engagement. Second, I examine how specific 
contexts, identities, and one’s experience with discrimination might affect this 
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relationship. I examine the role of community safety, gender, race, socioeconomic 
status, and discrimination based on these categories as well and how the effect of 
victimization on engagement differs among these subgroups.
Using data from the Two-City, Six-Wave Panel Survey administered in Juiz de 
Fora and Caxias do Sul, Brazil between the years of 2002 and 2006, I make a hand-
ful of contributions to this endeavor. First, I find that across the pooled sample vic-
timization does affect political engagement, but this effect seems to be dependent 
on the mode of engagement. Across the three modes explored (participation in po-
litical party meetings, participation in neighborhood associations, and engagement 
in political conversations), engagement only increases in political party meetings. 
All other measures see no change.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that context, certain identities, and expe-
rience with discrimination do influence the overall relationship between victimiza-
tion and engagement. However, this effect is tenuous. For example, we see men ex-
perience a positive shock to engagement following victimization that is statistically 
significant. We do not see a statistically significant shock among women. However, 
95 % confidence intervals for such results always overlap, suggesting further ad-
judication must be done to discover how robust such a difference in effect truly is.
These results provide an important contribution to the study of victimization 
and engagement, but are notably also specific to the context in which the survey 
was administered. Caxias do Sul and Juiz de Fora are not an accurate national rep-
resentation of Brazil. However, results from these cities do help us understand 
how victimization and engagement relate to one another in contexts of middling, 
urban violence. Of course, the security situation within these two cities is variable 
as well. Results further indicate there might be a relationship as well between the 
safety of one’s neighborhood and the effect of victimization on engagement. This 
comports with previous studies that suggest such a relationship (e.g., Trelles & Car-
reras, 2012; Brooks, 2014; Ley, 2018). Notably, further research should be done to 
conclude how the relationship between victimization and engagement might func-
tion in contexts with lower levels of violence and potentially in rural areas.
This research still leaves a variety of questions unanswered, and suggests mul-
tiple avenues for future research. First, it demonstrates that the effect of violence 
on engagement is specific to the mode of engagement. This suggests that further 
research should be done to explore this difference more in depth and with more 
modes of engagement. Does violence affect protest differently, as well? In addi-
tion, it is worth exploring if engagement increases in other realms of society follow-
ing victimization. For example, do victims increase their involvement in religious 
organizations, vigilante groups, or neighborhood watch groups? Particularly in the 
context of Brazil where informal governance is common (such as in lower income 
communities), do we see individuals seek out change from non-state governance 
groups instead? But, as this piece suggests, it is very important in assessing these 
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questions that researchers employ strategies that can truly reveal the causal na-
ture of such a relationship. This study employs a difference in difference frame-
work, taking advantage of a six wave panel survey, to show how engagement 
changes before and after victimization across the same individuals. Other research 
strategies could also be employed to accomplish this goal, such as more qualitative 
methods, including interviews, or quantitative methods that allow for causal con-
clusions, such as experiments.
REFERENCES
AmericasBarometer (2020). The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.Lap-
opSurveys.org.
Baker, A., Ames, B., Sokhey, A. E., Renno, L. R. (2015). Replication data for: The dynamics of 
partisan identification when party brands change: The case of the works party in Brazil. 
Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XSCFX5
Bardall, G., Bjarnegård, E., & Piscopo, J. M. (2020). How is political violence gendered? Disen-
tangling motives, forms, and impacts. Political Studies, 68(4), 916-935.
Barreto, M. A., & Woods, N. D. (2005). The anti-Latino political context and its impact on 
GOP detachment and increasing Latino voter turnout in Los Angeles County. In G.M. Se-
gura S. Bowler (Eds.). Diversity in democracy: Minority representation in the United States. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Bateson, R. (2012). Crime victimization and political participation. American Political Science 
Review, 106(3), 570-587. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000299
Bennett, S. E., Flickinger, R. S., & Rhine, S. L. (2000). Political talk over here, over there, over 
time. British Journal of Political Science, 30(1), 99-119.
Blattman, C. (2009). From violence to voting: War and political participation in Uganda. 
American Political Science Review, 103(2), 231-247.
Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political 
participation. American Political Science Review, 89(2), 271-294.
Bravo, C., and Maldonado G. (2012). Las balas y los votos: ¿qué efecto tiene la violencia so-
bre las elecciones? In J. A. Aguilar (Ed.). Las bases sociales de crimen organizado y la violen-
cia en México. México: Centro de Investigación y Estudios em Seguridad. 
Brooks, S. M. (2014). Insecure democracy: Risk and political participation in Brazil. The Jour-
nal of Politics, 76(4), 972-985.
Bueno, N. S., & Dunning, T. (2017). Race, Resources, and Representation Evidence from Bra-
zilian politicians. World Politics, 69(2), 327-365.
Bueno, N. S., & Fialho, F. M. (2009). Race, resources, and political participation in a Brazilian 
city. Latin American Research Review, 44(2), 59-83.
Cerqueira, D., Lima, R. S. D., Bueno, S., Valencia, L. I., Hanashiro, O., Machado, P. H. G., 
& Lima, A. D. S. (2017). Atlas da Violência 2017. URL: https://www.ipea.gov.br/
atlasviolencia/download/24/atlas-da-violencia-2020
Cicatiello, L., Ercolano, S., & Gaeta, G. L. (2015). Income distribution and political participa-
tion: a multilevel analysis. Empirica, 42(2), 447-479.
ISABEL LATERZO 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND CRIME VICTIMIZATION: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS
| 36 |
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / cc by-nc-nd RLOP. Vol. 10, 1 (2021), 7-37
Data UNODC by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. URL: https://dataunodc.
un.org
Desposato, S., & Norrander, B. (2009). The gender gap in Latin America: Contextual and indi-
vidual influences on gender and political participation. British Journal of Political Science, 
39(1), 141-162.
Flesken, A., & Hartl, J. (2020). Ethnicity, inequality, and perceived electoral fairness. Social 
Science Research, 85, 102363. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.102363
Gay, R. (1990). Neighborhood associations and political change in Rio de Janeiro. Latin 
American Research Review, 25(1), 102-118.
Granberg, D., & Holmberg, S. (1991). Self-reported turnout and voter validation. American 
Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 448-459.
Hadzic, D., Carlson, D., & Tavits, M. (2020). How exposure to violence affects ethnic voting. 
British Journal of Political Science, 50(1), 345-362.
Hadzic, D., & Tavits, M. (2019). The gendered effects of violence on political engagement. 
The Journal of Politics, 81(2), 676-680.
Honaker, J., King, G., & Blackwell, M. (2011). Amelia II: A program for missing data. Journal of 
Statistical Software, 45(7), 1-47.
Janusz, A., & Campos, L. A. (2018). Candidate Advertisements and Afro-Brazilian Political 
Marginalization. Latin American Research Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: htt-
ps://ssrn.com/abstract=3690578
Karp, J. A., & Brockington, D. (2005). Social desirability and response validity: A comparative 
analysis of overreporting voter turnout in five countries. The Journal of Politics, 67(3), 
825-840.
King, G. & Nielson, R. (2019). Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for Matching. Po-
litical Analysis, 27(4), 435-454.
Laterzo, I. 2020. Don’t Call the Police? Measuring and Explaining the Dark Figure of Crime, 
Working Paper.
Leighley, J. E., & Vedlitz, A. (1999). Race, ethnicity, and political participation: Competing 
models and contrasting explanations. The Journal of Politics, 61(4), 1092-1114.
Ley, S. (2013). An Overview of the Political Consequences of Crime and Insecurity in Latin 
America. Latin America Policy Journal, 2, 21-26.
Ley, S. (2017). Electoral accountability in the midst of criminal violence: Evidence from Mex-
ico. Latin American Politics and Society, 59(1), 3-27.
Ley, S. (2018). To vote or not to vote: how criminal violence shapes electoral participation. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(9), 1963-1990.
Li, Y., & Marsh, D. (2008). New forms of political participation: Searching for expert citizens 
and everyday makers. British Journal of Political Science, 247-272.
Miguel, L. F. (2008). Political representation and gender in Brazil: Quotas for women and 
their impact. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 27(2), 197-214.
OECD Better Life Index. (2020). OECD. URL: http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/
countries/brazil/
Oosterhoff, B., Kaplow, J. B., Layne, C. M., & Pynoos, R. S. (2018). Civilization and its discon-
tented: Links between youth victimization, beliefs about government, and political par-
ticipation across seven American presidencies. American Psychologist, 73(3), 230-242.
ISABEL LATERZO 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND CRIME VICTIMIZATION: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS
| 37 |
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / cc by-nc-nd RLOP. Vol. 10, 1 (2021), 7-37
Oskooii, K. A. (2016). How discrimination impacts sociopolitical behavior: A multidimen-
sional perspective. Political Psychology, 37(5), 613-640.
Oskooii, K. A. (2020). Perceived discrimination and political behavior. British Journal of Politi-
cal Science, 50(3), 867-892.
Power, T. J. (2009). Compulsory for whom? Mandatory voting and electoral participation in 
Brazil, 1986-2006. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 1(1), 97-122.
Rosenbaum, P. R. (1984). The consequences of adjustment for a concomitant variable that 
has been affected by the treatment. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Gen-
eral), 147(5), 656-666.
Rosenbaum, P. R. (2015). How to see more in observational studies: Some new quasi-exper-
imental devices. The Annual Review of Statistics and Its Applications, 2, 21-48.
Schildkraut, D. J. (2005). The rise and fall of political engagement among Latinos: The role of 
identity and perceptions of discrimination. Political Behavior, 27(3), 285-312.
Stuart, E. A., King, G., Imai, K., & Ho, D. (2011). MatchIt: nonparametric preprocessing for 
parametric causal inference. Journal of Statistical Software, 42(8).
Telles, E. (2007). “Racial Discrimination and Miscegenation: The Experience in Brazil.” 
UN Chronicle. The United Nations. URL: https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/
racial-discrimination-and-miscegenation-experience-brazil
Trelles, A., & Carreras, M. (2012). Bullets and votes: Violence and electoral participation in 
Mexico. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 4(2), 89-123.
Van Deth, J. W. (2014). A conceptual map of political participation. Acta Politica, 49(3), 
349-367.
Visconti, G. (2020). Policy preferences after crime victimization: panel and survey evidence 
from Latin America. British Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 1481-1495.
Vráblíková, K. (2014). How context matters? Mobilization, political opportunity structures, 
and nonelectoral political participation in old and new democracies. Comparative Politi-
cal Studies, 47(2), 203-229.
Watson, K. (2020). Coronavirus: Brazil’s favela residents organise to stop the spread. BBC 
News. URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52137165
Williams, M. S. (2000). Voice, trust, and memory: Marginalized groups and the failings of liberal 
representation. Princeton University Press.
Wunsch, G., Russo, F., & Mouchart, M. (2010). Do we necessarily need longitudinal data to 
infer causal relations? Bulletin of Sociological Methodology/Bulletin de Méthodologie Soci-
ologique, 106(1), 5-18.

